Iris: Deep Reinforcement Learning Driven Shared Spectrum Access
  Architecture for Indoor Neutral-Host Small Cells by Foukas, Xenofon et al.
1Iris: Deep Reinforcement Learning Driven
Shared Spectrum Access Architecture for
Indoor Neutral-Host Small Cells
Xenofon Foukas, Member, IEEE, Mahesh K. Marina, Senior Member, IEEE
and Kimon Kontovasilis
Abstract
We consider indoor mobile access, a vital use case for current and future mobile networks. For this
key use case, we outline a vision that combines a neutral-host based shared small-cell infrastructure
with a common pool of spectrum for dynamic sharing as a way forward to proliferate indoor small-cell
deployments and open up the mobile operator ecosystem. Towards this vision, we focus on the challenges
pertaining to managing access to shared spectrum (e.g., 3.5GHz US CBRS spectrum). We propose Iris, a
practical shared spectrum access architecture for indoor neutral-host small-cells. At the core of Iris is a
deep reinforcement learning based dynamic pricing mechanism that efficiently mediates access to shared
spectrum for diverse operators in a way that provides incentives for operators and the neutral-host alike.
We then present the Iris system architecture that embeds this dynamic pricing mechanism alongside
cloud-RAN and RAN slicing design principles in a practical neutral-host design tailored for the indoor
small-cell environment. Using a prototype implementation of the Iris system, we present extensive
experimental evaluation results that not only offer insight into the Iris dynamic pricing process and its
superiority over alternative approaches but also demonstrate its deployment feasibility.
Index Terms
Indoor mobile access, small cells, neutral host, RAN slicing, C-RAN, shared spectrum, dynamic
pricing, deep reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Mobile data traffic growth over the past decade and forecasts have been driving research on
scaling capacity of mobile networks. Much of this demand is from indoors, amounting to 80%
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2as of 2014 according to a Gartner study and expected to rise to over 95% by the time 5G gets
deployed [1]. Indoor cellular coverage, however, has traditionally been poor. Outdoor solutions for
indoor coverage are expensive due to building penetration losses [2]. Even Distributed Antenna
Systems (DAS) are found to be expensive except for a few large venues like stadiums [3], [4].
Indoor small cells are considered relatively promising to address the coverage issue and scale the
infrastructure with user density/demand. Indeed, making cells smaller and denser has historically
been the biggest contributor to capacity scaling of cellular networks [5]. Despite this potential,
indoor small cell deployments have been hampered due to operator concerns over deployment
costs (and return on that investment) and issues such as site access and backhaul.
For the cost-efficient and simplified deployment of indoor small-cell networks for all operators,
there is an emerging consensus around the notion of a “neutral-host” [6]–[15]. The key idea is that
the site owner (i.e. the neutral-host) offers indoor mobile access as a building amenity by taking
the responsibility of deploying and managing the small-cell infrastructure and by allowing multiple
operators to share it for a fee that covers the neutral-host’s CapEx and OpEx (e.g. deployment,
management and electricity cost), thus offering small-cells as a service1. The neutral-host becomes
the only entity that needs to address issues such as power and backhaul, relieving the operators
of deploying their own infrastructure and dealing with the associated challenges. Considering
the ever-increasing significance of mobile access for users, the site owner is motivated to act as
a neutral-host by the need to provide a high quality of experience for the building residents and
visitors (thus increasing the value of the property), while the operators are motivated to pay a fee
to gain indoor access rather than relying on their outdoor RAN infrastructure in order to improve
their indoor coverage [16], [17] (although providing a service with degraded quality to indoor users
through their outdoor infrastructure is still a valid option to avoid paying a fee to the neutral-host).
As virtualization is a natural means for sharing the small-cell infrastructure, the neutral-
host concept aligns well with the 5G vision of supporting a diverse array of services across
different Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) and verticals via network slicing. From
this perspective, the neutral-host provides each operator (also referred to as a tenant henceforth)
a virtual radio access network (vRAN) spanning the area of the indoor environment it covers;
this vRAN becomes part of the operator’s end-to-end network solution, including its existing
1The neutral-host is a more general concept that could also be applicable in other settings (e.g. outdoor, rural, etc.), however
our focus here is on the indoor scenario.
3core network or a cloud realization of the core (e.g., [18]). However, a vanilla realization of the
neutral-host concept that serves just traditional mobile network operators (MNOs) bringing their
own licensed spectrum offers limited incentives for the neutral-host and operators alike [6].
We envision that the potential of the neutral-host’s infrastructure sharing capability would be
significantly amplified through access to a pool of spectrum that is dynamically shared among oper-
ators. Firstly, traditional MNOs would be able to gain access to additional spectrum for increasing
their capacity and for offloading purposes. Secondly, by removing the requirement to possess
licensed spectrum (which typically only a handful of operators have), it allows new non-traditional
operators into the fray, who may come with innovative revenue models differing from the traditional
subscription-based model (e.g., free access that is monetized by advertising and analytics a la
Internet services and free mobile apps). Lastly, the aforementioned increase in the network capacity
offered by the additional spectrum and the potential cost reductions offered to users (or even free
access) can greatly improve their quality of experience, which as already mentioned is the main
incentive of the site owner to act as a neutral-host in the first place. In fact, there is more support
for the neutral-host model following the 3GPP defined multi-operator core network (MOCN)
form of network sharing, which requires use of common spectrum shared between operators [6].
The neutral-host’s common (and dynamic) spectrum pool could in principle be made up
of licensed spectrum pooled from different MNOs, unlicensed spectrum or shared access
spectrum [19]. Regarding the latter, recent regulatory developments below 6 GHz allow sharing
of lightly used spectrum held by legacy or public-sector incumbents (e.g., radars) via tiered
spectrum access models [20]–[22], offering substantial amounts of spectrum at a lower acquisition
cost compared to licensed spectrum and without the complex coexistence issues of unlicensed
spectrum. The Citizen Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) in the US [23] is a case in point,
allowing the shared use of the 3.5 GHz band via a three-tier access model; a management
entity called Spectrum Access System (SAS) ensures that when higher tier users need to use
the spectrum, they get interference protection from lower tier ones. In fact, a new LTE-based
service called OnGo that is operating over CBRS spectrum is promoted by the CBRS Alliance
as an ideal solution for neutral-host deployments [16]. Licensed shared access (LSA) model for
spectrum sharing [24] that is promoted for some bands in Europe, especially in its dynamic form,
is another such relevant development. In view of the above, we consider the scenario where the
neutral host is powered by shared access spectrum in the style of CBRS or LSA.
4B. Paper Overview and Contributions
The focus of this work is on addressing the challenges that arise with respect to managing
access to shared spectrum in an indoor neutral-host small-cell environment, which constitute the
requirements for the desired system:
1) As the neutral-host needs to support multiple (traditional and non-traditional) operators all
competing in offering broadly the same type of service to users, the system should facilitate
for each tenant service differentiation over rival tenants and control over its share of resources
without requiring direct/explicit interaction among tenants. These are key concerns from the
operators perspective to incentivize their participation in neutral-host small cells [6]. This
requirement means that tenants should not have to reveal any private information regarding
their business model to the neutral-host; instead they should operate in isolation with respect
to each other and the neutral-host, and should be able to dynamically change their private
spectrum valuations.
2) The system should provide a control mechanism to enable the efficient and dynamic spectrum
sharing among tenants by aiming to closely match the spectrum supply with the tenants’
demand. This should be done in a way that tenants who value the spectrum most get it,
especially during periods of congestion (e.g., due to insufficient spectrum availability). The
allocation of radio resources to tenants should be performed in a way that respects this
constraint. Being in a position to satisfy the tenants’ demand, also implies the satisfaction of
their service level agreements (SLAs). However, given that the shared spectrum availability
can change dynamically and unexpectedly over time, hard SLAs may be infeasible for the
tenants and therefore the desired system should aim to provide soft SLAs instead.
3) The neutral-host should be able to cover its expenses for offering the service, including the
fixed costs (e.g. deployment, management and electricity) and also a time-varying spectrum
acquisition cost [25], depending on the amount of the shared spectrum acquired to meet the
overall demand. This last cost needs to be recouped from the tenants in a dynamic manner,
since any pre-agreed static fee may either overcharge the tenants or put the neutral-host in
losses. Crucially, as already explained, the primary goal of the neutral-host is to provide a
high quality of experience for building residents and visitors, and doing so without incurring
losses. So revenue maximization is not the main driver although a revenue target linked
with the neutral-host’s incentive to provide the service with some profit margin (adjusted
5depending on the deployment environment) could also exist. Note that the environment in
which the neutral-host operates is not a monopoly (e.g., tenants could opt to use their own
external RAN with degraded quality of service).
4) The solution approach meeting the above requirements should be realizable in the context
of a shared spectrum based neutral-host small cell system architecture that is practical in
terms of algorithmic complexity, signaling overhead, etc.
Our key insight in this paper is that pricing can be an effective control mechanism to meet
the first two aforementioned requirements. Pricing has been effectively employed in other
contexts [26]–[29] to regulate demand and enable efficient sharing of resources with service
differentiation, while it also naturally allows meeting the third requirement of neutral-host cost
recovery and achieving a revenue goal if it exists. Given that tenant behaviors and traffic demands
as well as spectrum availability can vary over time, a single optimal fixed price may not exist and
thus pricing has to be dynamic. On the complementary side, we view a cloud RAN (C-RAN) [30]
architecture to be more suitable for the indoor neutral-host small cell environment, due to the
better scaling it offers in terms of spectrum availability, number of tenants etc., while allowing
a cheaper and denser small-cell radio infrastructure. The result is our proposed approach Iris, a
novel dynamic pricing shared spectrum access architecture for indoor neutral-host small-cells.
The key components of the proposed Iris approach and our contributions are outlined below:
• (§III) We design a neutral-host system following C-RAN and RAN slicing design principles
that embeds a dynamic pricing mechanism that regulates the allocation of spectrum to
tenants by determining the price at which tenants can obtain a share of spectrum at any
given time instant, while also considering the cost/revenue requirements of the neutral-host.
• (§IV) In view of the stochastic nature of the neutral-host’s environment with several unknowns
(tenant behaviors, future demands and spectrum availability), we model the pricing decision
problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and resolve it using reinforcement learning. As
the large state space and continuous action space of the problem make common reinforcement
learning techniques slow and inefficient (as we experimentally demonstrate), we leverage
recent machine learning advances and employ deep reinforcement learning. Unlike the
Iris dynamic pricing mechanism, existing spectrum sharing mechanisms relevant for the
neutral-host context [31]–[38] fail to meet some of the necessary requirements listed above,
as discussed in the next section.
6• (§V) We develop a prototype implementation of Iris, with the goal of demonstrating the
feasibility of our proposed mechanism, thereby satisfying the fourth practicality requirement
above. To our knowledge, relative to existing neutral-host designs [39]–[41], this is the
first design accounting for the peculiarities of spectrum sharing and the indoor small cell
environment, along with a concrete implementation.
• (§VI) Using the above mentioned prototype implementation, we demonstrate the system’s
feasibility in practice and conduct extensive experimental evaluations — characterizing the
learning behavior of Iris, its performance in different conditions, and highlighting its superi-
ority with respect to static pricing and alternative approaches from the literature [38], [42].
II. RELATED WORK
Dynamic pricing in other contexts. Fundamentally, the pricing problem we have bears similarity
with the pricing work in the Internet congestion control context [26], [42]. In these works, pricing
is used as a signal to regulate the rates of senders for efficiently sharing network resources
(e.g., bandwidth of links). Referring to [42], for example, each link in the network sets a price
depending on its aggregate demand from all senders and each sender adjusts its rate independently
in a way that maximizes its net utility after accounting for the bandwidth cost. The key difference
from our case is that these works do not have the equivalent of requirement (3) (§I-B), regarding
the need of the neutral-host to reach a revenue target that will allow it to cover its expenses.
Dynamic pricing has also been successfully applied in various other contexts where regulation
of demand is required [28], [29], [43]. In those cases the focus is on controlling the end-user
demand by the operators, unlike our case of spectrum sharing among operators via the neutral-host.
Spectrum sharing in the RAN slicing context. Neutral-host spectrum sharing can be seen as a
specific form of RAN slicing and as such, RAN slicing mechanisms are relevant. There exist several
algorithmic works [31]–[37] focusing on either the base station level (e.g., [34], [36]) or the RAN
level (e.g., [31], [32], [35]), allocating radio resources to slices based on their SLAs. As all these
mechanisms centralize the resource allocation at the infrastructure provider (neutral-host in our set-
ting), they fail to meet requirement (1) (§I-B). Also, with the exception of [33] where revenue max-
imization for the infrastructure provider is considered, others do not meet requirement (3) of recov-
ering costs and reaching the revenue target of the neutral-host. With respect to requirement (2), the
focus on strict SLAs in these works may also be limiting when dealing with shared access spectrum.
7A recent work [38] explicitly targets the shared spectrum neutral-host setting but shares the
same limitations as the above mentioned works. It presents several pre-determined spectrum
allocation policies at the neutral-host, mostly SLA based with the exception of one that assumes
all tenants have the same utilities and allocates spectrum proportional to their traffic loads. We
consider the latter in our comparative evaluations to highlight the service differentiation benefit
of Iris.
Spectrum sharing without infrastructure sharing. The allocation of shared spectrum has
also been considered in settings where operators deploy independent infrastructures [44]–[50].
Some works assume that participating operators have predetermined agreements regarding their
priority for accessing the spectrum in cases of congestion (e.g., [44]), while others focus on the
architectural aspect of the system (e.g., [46]) or on the coordination among operators (e.g., [48],
[49]).
Auction-based dynamic spectrum sharing mechanisms. A rich body of literature on dynamic
spectrum auction mechanisms is broadly related [51]–[60]. The most relevant from our context
are [52], [53] but both have limitations from a practicality standpoint. The mechanism in [52]
requires continual exchange of information between tenants and the neutral-host about each
end-user device, and it allows only discrete number of traffic rates for tenant resource requests.
[53] proposes a hierarchical auction-based mechanism that requires the involvement of end-users
in the auction.
More fundamentally, any auctioning mechanism for our setting has to handle a time-varying
spectrum acquisition cost for the neutral-host along with its revenue target, which requires a
dynamic reserve price. Setting such a reserve price statically and in a naive way effectively leads
to the same limitation as in the case of [42] in terms of meeting requirement (3) (something that
is also demonstrated in Section VI-D). In contrast, in this work we demonstrate the capability of
Iris to meet the aforementioned requirement and to effectively satisfy the tenants’ demand through
the system’s dynamic pricing decisions. Furthermore, it should be noted that Iris’s decisions could
also be used as an enabler of auction-based spectrum sharing mechanisms for our setting in
cases where price differentiation among tenants is required, i.e. by setting the reserve prices of
an auction-based scheme based on the pricing decision of Iris.
Neutral-host system designs and specifications. A number of recent designs that consider
multi-tenancy support in mobile RANs are applicable to the indoor neutral-host small cell setting.
Perhaps the ones most relevant are: Orion [41], SESAME [39] and ESSENCE [40]. However, these
8Fig. 1: Schematic of Iris neutral-host system architecture.
works do not consider the use of shared spectrum and its implications, the main focus of this paper.
In terms of specifications targeting the neutral-host setting, nFAPI [61] is the most relevant one in
which a functional split at the MAC layer is specified and each virtual operator is assigned a VNF
implementing the higher-layer protocols. However, in contrast to our work, each tenant is assigned a
static chunk of spectrum. Another closely related specification is MulteFire [62], which is a form of
LTE deployment in unlicensed bands. In contrast to our work, the focus of MulteFire is on the ways
to enable co-existence with other technologies operating over unlicensed spectrum (e.g. Wi-Fi).
III. IRIS SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The design of Iris builds on the observation that the small-cell infrastructure sharing capability
offered by a neutral-host is a particular albeit compelling use case of the broader RAN slicing
in the 5G context. However, a vanilla RAN slicing system would be insufficient to address the
specific needs of shared spectrum management and indoor small-cell environments. The design
of Iris addresses these needs (Fig. 1) by embracing the cloud RAN (C-RAN) paradigm, with
baseband processing units (BBUs) centralized in a virtualized BBU pool located in an edge cloud
(e.g., in the basement of the indoor space) and remote radio units (RRUs) deployed throughout
the building in a planned manner. The RRUs are connected to the BBUs over high speed channels
(e.g., 10-Gigabit Ethernet or Fiber). This approach places most of the RAN processing on the edge
cloud which allows the system to scale better as BBU resources can be adaptively provisioned
9depending on the number of tenants and the spectrum availability. It also lowers the form factor
of the RRUs, making their deployment easier and discreet from a building aesthetics viewpoint.
Each tenant is allocated a Virtual RAN Controller, deployed as a Virtual Network Function
(VNF) over the edge cloud. The controllers interface with the BBUs using message-based
communication and provide tenant-specific functions such as schedulers and mobility managers,
as well as an agent for the allocation of shared spectrum (discussed shortly).
At the heart of Iris lies the spectrum manager, a centralized controller managed by the neutral-
host. This controller informs the BBUs about the amount and type of available spectrum (shared
or privately owned) and about its valid allocations, depending on the access rights of tenants,
distinguishing in particular between tenants operating exclusively over shared spectrum and
tenants that can also use their own private licensed spectrum. A shared spectrum acquisition
manager acquires the shared spectrum in a demand driven manner through a public repository
(e.g., SAS in the CBRS context). Moreover, this controller manages interference among small
cells. Due to the system’s C-RAN based design, the VNF of the spectrum manager co-exists with
the virtualized BBU pool over the same edge cloud, simplifying its coordination with the BBUs
through low-latency and high bandwidth channels and enabling the use of advanced interference
management techniques like Coordinated Multipoint (CoMP) [63].
Shared spectrum allocation process in Iris. Crucially, the spectrum manager hosts a pricing
policy agent and is responsible for dynamically deciding the price for the tenants to use shared
spectrum resources. The dynamic pricing mechanism of Iris follows a time slotted operation for the
allocation of shared spectrum, with each slot referred to as an epoch henceforth. The functionality
of the dynamic pricing mechanism is distributed among three distinct agents as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The pricing policy agent initiates the shared spectrum allocation process in each epoch, deciding
on the price for each cell using a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that is described in
depth in §IV-C. The pricing policy agent announces the current epoch, the spectrum availability
and the cell specific prices to the respective cell agents residing in the BBUs, which in turn
convey the price to the tenant agents residing in the tenants’ virtual RAN controllers. Each tenant
considers the announced price along with its traffic load at the cell in question to decide on
quantity of resource to be requested as dictated by its internal private policy. The tenant requests
are aggregated at the cell agent, which distributes the available shared spectrum proportionally to
the tenants’ requests and notifies the pricing policy agent about the allocated resources, the load
of the tenants etc. The schedulers running in the virtual RAN controllers of the tenants use the
10
Fig. 2: Iris agents involved in dynamic pricing mechanism.
allocated resources to serve the traffic of their UEs as per the tenants’ internal policies. Once the
allocation process is complete, the pricing policy agent uses the feedback obtained from the cells
in terms of the behavior of the tenants and decides on a new price for the upcoming epoch.
IV. IRIS DYNAMIC PRICING MECHANISM
In this section, we describe the core component of Iris – its dynamic pricing mechanism.
A. System Model
Tenant resource requests. In our model, tenants express their resource requests in terms of
radio resource blocks (RBs) through the Iris tenant agents. We assume that tenants have a way to
map their aggregate throughput demands into the number of RBs required (e.g., by assuming an
average spectral efficiency for every RB). Such a mapping is reasonable, considering that indoor
small cell deployments are typically planned to provide near-optimal performance to users (UEs)
within 20-30m [64].
Neutral-host and tenant interaction. As already described, the neutral-host follows a time
slotted operation in the form of epochs for the allocation of shared spectrum. The duration of an
epoch is expected to be short (e.g., 20-100ms), allowing the neutral-host to allocate radio resources
in real-time. In each epoch t, the neutral-host determines a resource block price pt ∈ [pmin, pmax]
through its pricing policy agent with which the tenants can buy the available resources. Our
model does not assume predetermined bounds to the range of prices, providing enough flexibility
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to set pmin and pmax according to the pricing characteristics of the specific domain in which Iris
is deployed. The range of possible prices is assumed to be known to the tenants a priori (e.g.,
specified in their contract), allowing them to develop their radio resource acquisition policies
according to the expected prices. Without loss of generality, we consider dynamic pricing for the
allocation of downlink radio resources; the uplink can be treated similarly.
In each epoch t, all tenants see the price pt announced by the neutral-host (through the cell
agents) and decide how many resources to buy. The neutral-host is oblivious to the behavior of
the tenants, not knowing the internal mechanism (possibly changing over time) that governs their
decisions. Consequently, the high level goal of the neutral host would be to “predict” the demand
of tenants at any point in time and dynamically decide on a price that would utilize the resources
as efficiently as possible while recovering its cost and maximizing the tenant satisfaction, by
allocating the radio resources according to the expressed tenant demands. The model presented
here is compatible with very general tenant behavior patterns, deterministic (e.g., driven by the
optimization of utility functions) or not. Due to this generality, our model does not require a
concrete definition of the tenants’ behavior and simply relies on the fact that tenants express
their demands in terms of resource block requests. It is noted that in Section VI and for the sake
of concreteness of our evaluation, we model the different tenant behaviors in the form of a rich
set of utility functions, which are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of Iris.
To model the temporal evolution of the tenants’ demand, we divide a day into H periods, each
e epochs long, so that He epochs make up 24h in the day. This construction makes a period
correspond to an appropriate time interval within a day (e.g., an hour in a day) so that tenants’
behavior is not expected to vary within a period but could across periods. Clearly, the shorter
the period, the finer the granularity at which tenant behavioral changes can be captured. Without
restricting generality, one may index periods within a day in the range 0 ≤ h < H and may
take the evolution of the system to start at epoch t = 0 coinciding with the beginning of a day.
With this convention, the index of the current epoch t maps to the index of the current period
of the day as: h(t) = (t div e) mod H. It should be noted that the scheme imposes a natural
synchronization, in which all tenants can always refer to the correct current epoch. In the rest
of this section, we will use superscripts of the form ·t to denote the time dependency of any
quantity including cases when it occurs indirectly through h(t).
Shared spectrum acquisition cost and revenue target of the neutral-host. Let nt ∈ Z be
the number of RBs obtained by the neutral-host from an external/public spectrum repository
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in epoch t. To maintain flexibility, the pricing mechanism regards the interaction between the
public repository and the neutral-host in abstract terms. Consequently, { nt, t ≥ 0 } is a stochastic
process and the neutral-host, although informed about the current value nt , is unaware of the
process’ future dynamics so dynamics of a very general form can be accommodated. The only
assumption (to enable the MDP framework discussed later) is that nt+1, conditioned on the value
of nt , follows a probability distribution (unknown to the neutral-host) that may depend on t
and/or the current load of the tenants. This is a very mild assumption compatible with virtually
all scenarios of practical interest.
To capture the neutral-host’s incentive for participation, we introduce a target revenue level T .
The value of T represents the per epoch revenue that the neutral-host expects to obtain through
the dynamic pricing scheme for the particular small-cell in question. Generally, T can change
dynamically as the neutral host seeks to offset its OpEx that encapsulates not just fixed costs like
electricity and management of the infrastructure, but also dynamic costs like the the cost for the
amount of RBs nt obtained from the external spectrum repository in epoch t. In the following we
will use the notation T(nt) to signify this functional dependence. This notion of a target revenue
level is general enough to also capture other types of expenses (e.g. electricity) and could also
be used to accommodate more general profit aims of the neutral-host (e.g., to dynamically adjust
its profit margin according to the conditions of its environment).
System dynamics and neutral-host’s small-cell resource allocation. Let I be the set of
tenants served by the system. For each tenant i ∈ I, the expected load of a cell in epoch t is
denoted by lti , representing the total traffic that tenant i is expected to serve during epoch t. For
example, this could be the bytes stored in the transmission buffers of all the UEs of the tenant
in the cell and a forecast of any new traffic expected during epoch t. This can accommodate very
general dynamics for the evolution of lti , for all i ∈ I. The only assumption made (to enable the
MDP formulation) is that lt+1i , conditioned on the value of l
t
i , follows a probability distribution
that may depend on one or more of: the time t, the amount of radio resources nt , and the price pt .
The tenant i’s behavior at epoch t is captured through its RB request νti ∈ Z. The dynamics
of νti can be general, the only restriction being that ν
t+1
i , conditioned on the value of ν
t
i , follows
a probability distribution (unknown to the neutral-host), whose form may depend on one or more
of: the time t, the current tenant load lti and the price pt .
The collective request across all tenants may exceed the amount of available resources, i.e., it
is possible for
∑
i∈I νti > n
t . In such a case, the neutral-host would allocate the available resources
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proportionally to the tenants’ requests. By using uti to denote the resources actually allocated to
tenant i in epoch t, this allocation rule translates into
uti (®νt) =
νti∑
j∈I νtj
min{ nt,
∑
j∈I
νtj }, ∀i ∈ I, (1)
where ®νt stands for a vector containing the tenants’ requests. Always, ∑i∈I uti ≤ nt . And uti = νti
for all i ∈ I, when nt ≥ ∑i∈I νti .
B. Problem Formulation
Given the system model just described, we now formulate the neutral-host’s dynamic pricing
problem as a discrete-time, continuous state and action space MDP. Essentially, the neutral-host
observes the state of its environment and makes a decision for an action (price pt) based on this
observation, getting a reward while transitioning the environment into a new state. We denote
this action as at ∈ A where at = pt .
The state (xt) of the neutral-host’s environment in epoch t is made up of the vector ®νt−1 of
virtual radio resources requested by the tenants in the previous epoch t − 1, a vector ®lt containing
the current loads lti of the tenants and the number of available radio resources at the neutral-host
nt . That is,
xt := (®νt−1, ®lt, nt) ∈ X . (2)
Note that xt is known to the neutral-host as it either contains information maintained by itself or
obtained from the tenants every time they request resources.
The reward function of the neutral-host is designed so that it can capture the first three
requirements of the system as identified in Section I-B. Using the action notation at for the price
decision pt , the reward function is defined as
r(xt+1, at | xt) = f (nt−
∑
i∈I νti
nt )g(
at
∑
i∈I uti ( ®νti )
T(nt ) ). (3)
Indeed, the first requirement of the system is met, as the tenant behaviors are hidden from the
neutral-host, which only has tenant resource requests (νti ) to glean that information (as part of
the state given as input to the reward function).
The second requirement, i.e., avoiding a mismatch between resource supply and demand is
handled through the first factor on the right hand side of (3). In the argument of the function f ,
this mismatch is expressed in a relative sense to make the reward function behave in the same
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way regardless of the amount of available spectrum. A zero value of this argument signifies a
desirable perfect match between supply and demand. Positive values of the argument signify
resource under-utilization (nt >
∑
i∈I νti ). Avoiding it would leave room to allocate more resources
to tenants and increase their satisfaction. Negative values of the argument signify excess demand
(nt <
∑
i∈I νti ). This should be avoided, as the proportional allocation in rule (1) gives some
tenants fewer RBs than those requested at this price, leading to a decrease in their satisfaction.
These are all met by defining the function f as
f (x) = e−x2/σ2, σ > 0. (4)
With this Gaussian form, the highest contribution to the reward is attained when x = 0 (perfect
match) while positive or negative mismatches are penalized at an exponential rate. The parameter σ
tunes the “sensitivity” of f – smaller values of σ penalize resource mismatches more aggressively.
The second factor of (3) corresponds to the third system requirement of avoiding a mismatch
between the actual and target levels of revenue. The argument of the function g is the ratio of
these two levels. The ideal case is when this argument is equal to 1, a perfect match between
actual and target revenues. When the argument is smaller than 1, the actual revenue is below the
target. This should be avoided as it signifies a reduced incentive for the neutral-host to provide
the service (the neutral-host is experiencing losses). When the argument is greater than 1, the
revenue exceeds the target level. This should also be avoided as it suggests that a lower price
could also satisfy the goal of the neutral-host which could potentially improve the satisfaction of
the tenants. All these features can be incorporated, by letting
g(x) =
( min{1, x}
max{1, x}
)δ
, δ ≥ 0. (5)
The highest reward contribution occurs when there is a perfect match (x = 1) while mismatches
are penalized according to a power law. The value of δ tunes the sensitivity of g, higher values of δ
penalizing revenue mismatches more aggressively. Moreover, the joint tuning of the parameters
σ and δ can adjust the relative importance between the two factors f and g of the reward
function. By making the values of any of these parameters smaller, the neutral-host tends to care
more about the utilization of resources by the tenants and to disregard its own level of revenue.
Increasing the values of the parameters has a reciprocal effect.
With the reward function (3), the behavior of the neutral-host is defined by a policy pi, which
maps the states to a probability distribution over the actions pi : X → Pr(A). With the mild
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assumptions stated in §IV-A and the neutral-host’s state as in (2), the state transitions from xt to
xt+1 given the action at satisfy the Markov property and thus, applying a policy pi to this MDP
defines a Markov chain. We denote expectations over this chain by Epi. We define the return
from a state xt as the sum of the discounted future rewards: Rt =
∑∞
τ=t γ
(τ−t)r(xτ+1, aτ | xτ) for
a discounting factor γ ∈ [0, 1] [65]. The goal of the neutral-host then is to find a pricing policy
that will maximize its expected returns from the start state Epi
[
R0
]
over an infinite horizon. It
should be noted that the choice for using a discounted rather than an average reward was mainly
driven by the unpredictability of the environment, which can potentially change over time (e.g.
tenants changing their spectrum acquisition policy).
C. Deep Reinforcement Learning Solution
Reinforcement learning is a common way to solve MDP problems where an exact model
describing the dynamics of the environment (e.g., tenant behavior and network traffic in our
case) is unavailable. Q-learning [66] is a well-known algorithm for such problems. Q-learning
employs an action-value function Qpi which describes the expected future return after taking the
action at in some state xt and following policy pi from that point on, i.e.,
Qpi(xt, at) = Epi
[
Rt |xt, at ] . (6)
This function can be expressed through a recursive relationship known as the Bellman equation:
Qpi(xt, at) = Er t,xt+1∼X
[
r(xt, at) + γQpi(xt+1, pi(xt+1))] . (7)
The policy used for the estimation of the discounted future reward of Q-learning is the greedy
policy pi(x) = arg maxaQ(x, a) whereas an exploration policy is employed for the state transitions
(e.g., take random actions). This makes Q-learning an off-policy method in that the policy pi
used to estimate the discounted future reward is different from the policy used for the action
of the learning agent in a state transition.
Though an obvious choice, Q-learning is not appropriate to our problem for several reasons.
Firstly, it uses a table to store its Q-values. When the state space of the problem is continuous or
very large (as in our problem due to the range of possible values for li, νi and n), calculating Qpi us-
ing a table becomes challenging. To overcome this, we need to rely on function approximators [67]
parametrized by θQ. These parameters can be optimized by minimizing the loss:
L(θQ) = Epi′
[(Q(xt, at |θQ) − yt)2] , (8)
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where
yt = r(xt, at) + γQ(xt+1, pi(xt+1)|θQ). (9)
In addition to the large state space, we also have to deal with a continuous action space (the
announced price) which needs to be discretized in order to use Q-learning. However, there is no
obvious or straightforward way to discretize the prices since the price range and its interpretation
can be environment dependent [67].
We find that policy gradient actor-critic algorithms (e.g., [68]) are more suitable for our purpose.
Such algorithms maintain a parametrized actor function pi(x |θpi) that estimates an action policy
and a parametrized critic function Q(x, a|θQ) that estimates the Q-values of action-state pairs
through the Bellman equation, as in Q-learning. The actor policy is improved at each step by
performing a gradient descent considering the estimated values of the critic. Recent works (e.g.,
[69]–[72]) show that using deep neural networks as the function approximators for the estimation
of actors and critics can produce better results compared to using linear approximators, when
the learning task presents similar complexity to the one we have in terms of its dimensionality,
including higher rewards (avoiding local optima) and improved convergence speed in some cases.
In view of the above, we choose to use a state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning actor-critic
algorithm called DDPG [69], which has been shown to consistently provide good results for a wide
range of problems and learning environments [71], [73]. The use of deep neural network approxi-
mators allows DDPG to scale to high-dimensional state spaces and operate over continuous action
spaces, ideal for our problem. One of its key features is the use of replay buffers (a type of cache) to
sample prior transitions (xt, at, xt+1, at+1) which are used to train the neural networks. It also uses a
technique called batch normalization that improves the effectiveness of the learning process when
using features with different units and ranges (e.g., RBs and time). Finally, it uses a technique that
employs slow-changing copies of the actor and critic networks, called target networks, which are
used for calculating yt . This has been shown to greatly improve the stability of the learning method.
Algorithm 1 gives an outline of the dynamic pricing mechanism in Iris. A new price pt is
selected at each epoch t (line 5) using the policy of the actor pi(x |θpi). Some exploration
noise  is added to the price to allow the agent to explore other states. The price is announced
to tenants (line 7) and their radio resource requests are collected in return2. Based on these
requests, Iris neutral-host allocates the radio resources following the rule in (1) (line 8); then
2An empty request is assumed if a tenant fails to respond at some epoch.
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Algorithm 1 Iris Dynamic Pricing Mechanism Outline
1: procedure DYNAMICPRICE
2: t ← 0
3: Receive initial network state x0 (state in first epoch of the day)
4: loop:
5: Choose a price pt given the policy of the actor
6: at ← pt +  , where  is exploration noise
7: Execute action at (announce price to tenants)
8: Collect the radio resource requests of tenants ®νt and distribute the allocated RBs uti ( ®νt ), ∀i ∈ I
9: Calculate the reward r t and transition to the state xt+1
10: Update the actor-critic parameters θQ and θpi (DDPG)
11: t ← t + 1
12: goto loop.
13: end procedure
calculates the reward r t and transitions into a new state xt+1 (line 9). The parameters of the
actor and the critic network are updated based on the DDPG algorithm (line 10), which is
the training step, and a new epoch t + 1 begins. Note that the learning process of Iris never stops,
allowing the pricing mechanism to re-train and adapt to new environments (e.g., as the tenants
change their valuations for the radio resources over time). To achieve this Iris employs a constant
learning rate for both the actor and the critic to update policies and, as already mentioned, uses
a discounted reward to account for the unpredictability of the environment.
Regarding the complexity of Iris’s dynamic pricing mechanism and based on the description
of Algorithm 1, it can be seen that Iris only depends on the number of tenants sharing the
infrastructure and is independent of the actual number of UEs associated with each tenant of the
system and the traffic that each UE generates. As a result, the computational complexity in the
neural networks of the actor and the critic employed by the DDPG algorithm increases linearly
in the number of input layer units as the number of tenants grow, with each tenant adding one
load li and one request νi feature to the input layer. Furthermore, the message exchanges required
by the proposed algorithm also increase linearly with the number of tenants. More specifically,
assuming N tenants, each round of the algorithm requires 3N message exchanges among the
neutral-host and the tenants – N messages for the announcement of the price by the neutral-host
to the tenants, N messages for the radio resource requests from the tenants to the neutral-host and
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N messages for the actual allocation of the radio resources to the tenants by the neutral-host. The
computational complexity and communication overhead of Iris allows it to scale in all settings of
practical interest, as demonstrated in the evaluation results presented in Section VI-B.
V. IRIS IMPLEMENTATION
Following the design and dynamic pricing mechanism described above and in order to be able
to assess the system’s practicality for a real deployment (as explored in §VI-B), we developed
a prototype of Iris, considering LTE as the radio access technology (RAT). To realize RAN
slicing, we leveraged the Orion RAN slicing system [41], which provides functionally isolated
virtual control planes (RAN controllers) for tenants and virtualized radio resources revealed to
them through a Hypervisor. Orion is in turn built on top of the OpenAirInterface (OAI) LTE
platform [74]. OAI has built-in C-RAN support offering three functional splits: lower-PHY,
higher-PHY and nFAPI [61]. Although in principle any of these functional splits could be used in
Iris, the Orion implementation is only compatible with the first two. Between them, considering
their differences in fronthaul bandwidth requirements (1Gbps with lower-PHY versus 280Mbps
for higher-PHY for a 20MHz carrier) [75], [76], we opt for the higher-PHY split.
Edge Cloud Deployment. To realize the Iris system design, we leveraged the OpenStack edge
cloud deployment of the University of Edinburgh presented in [77], which is composed of 5
compute nodes (24-core Xeon CPUs @2.1GHz and 32GB RAM each), optimized for real-time
operation (disabled CPU C-states, low-latency Linux kernel, no CPU frequency scaling, VNF
CPU pinning). For the RRUs, we employed USRP B210 Software-Defined Radios (SDRs), each
interfaced to a small form factor PC (UP board with 4GB of RAM and Intel Atom x5 Z8350
CPUs @1.92GHz), the latter acting as a compute node for running the lower part of the PHY
operations and for communication with the BBUs (over Gigabit Ethernet).
Spectrum Manager. We implemented a prototype Python-based spectrum manager to host the Iris
pricing policy agent, employing an existing implementation of DDPG [78] that uses Tensorflow
for the training of the deep neural networks. Given our hardware constraints, we used a Tensorflow
flavor that supports execution only on CPU (no GPU). Regarding the parameters of DDPG, we
retained the default values provided in the aforementioned implementation, with the actor and
the critic neural networks both having two hidden layers with 400 and 300 units, respectively.
For the representation of the state and action space, we employed the OpenAI Gym [79] toolkit.
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In a full implementation, shared spectrum support would make use of carrier aggregation.
However, given that this functionality is not currently supported by OAI, we used a contiguous
band of spectrum to simulate scaling the available shared spectrum up/down (by the spectrum
manager through signaling messages to the cell agents).
Cell Agents. Each cell agent in Iris is realized via modified Orion Hypervisor in the BBU. The radio
resource allocation scheme of Iris following rule (1) was introduced into the radio resource manager
of the Hypervisor. The Hypervisors were interfaced with the spectrum manager using Google
Protocol Buffers3 and ZeroMQ4. Finally, the protocol used for the communication of the Hypervi-
sors with the virtual control planes of tenants was extended to support the messages required for
the shared spectrum price announcements and the radio resource requests of the Iris tenant agents.
Tenant Agents. On the tenant side, we leveraged the Orion virtual control plane implementation,
which we extended with the Iris tenant agents. Note that our design (specifically the dynamic
pricing mechanism) is agnostic to tenant behaviors. For the sake of evaluations, our implementation
supports a rich set of tenant behaviors enacted in the form of utility functions (described in §VI-A).
However, our implementation could also support other ways of expressing the tenant behaviors.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
For our evaluations, we employ the prototype implementation of Iris (§V). The default
experimental setup corresponds to 4 tenants per cell. For experiments with a single small cell,
real UEs (LTE smartphones and dongles), one per tenant, and the D-ITG traffic generator [80]
were used to generate a simulated aggregate UDP traffic for the tenant. UEs were simulated for
scenarios with multiple small-cells due to the complexity of managing the experimental setup. It
should be noted that even though certain aspects of the system like the generated traffic were
simulated (and therefore a simpler simulation setup could also be used), employing the prototype
implementation is still crucial for the evaluation, since it provides critical insights regarding the
applicability and the overhead of the proposed mechanism in real settings, as discussed in §VI-B.
Tenant traffic loads and spectrum availability. To model the traffic loads of tenants, we
employed the daily aggregate traffic pattern presented in [81] for an entertainment area, a
3https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/
4http://zeromq.org/
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(a) Traffic load (b) Spectrum availability
Fig. 3: Daily traffic profile of tenants and spectrum availability profile over a day at the neutral-host.
representative indoor environment. We assume that the aggregate incoming hourly traffic of each
tenant follows a normal distribution with mean and variance depending on the particular hour
in the day considered as shown in Fig. 3a. With no real-world data to rely on, we consider a
reasonable spectrum availability profile in Fig. 3b. The idea behind this profile is that the available
shared spectrum is re-adjusted (with some delay) by the spectrum manager to approximately
match the traffic load. While some of the experiments span the whole day and use the full profiles
in Fig. 3, others focus on a particular hour and so use the traffic and spectrum values for that
hour. The default evaluation configuration is for the hour starting at 3pm and a cell with 5MHz
of available shared spectrum, emulating a CBRS-like service using LTE band 7. Small cells use a
SISO transmission mode, which for 5MHz spectrum corresponds to a max throughput of 16Mbps.
Dynamic pricing mechanism settings. The epoch duration is set to 30ms (based on results in
§VI-B), while the presented results correspond to the parameter σ = 1 for (4) and δ = 1 for (5). The
price range is set to [0, pmax] with pmax = 2500. In setting the target revenue level T , we consider
the case where the neutral-host is concerned only with recovering the cost associated with shared
spectrum acquisition. Accordingly, we set T(n) = pcn, where pc is the cost incurred to the small cell
for the acquisition of a single RB. We use the value pc = 850, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Modeling different tenant behaviors. As already discussed in Section IV-A, our model is com-
patible with very general tenant behavior patterns. For the sake of concreteness of our evaluation
and to demonstrate the effectiveness of Iris, we modeled the behavior of tenants through dis-utility
functions possessing generic parameterizable structure, formulated on the basis of detailed analysis
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that can be found in the appendix. Specifically, the dis-utility functions have the form
U¯(b; d, p) =
(
α(max(0, d − b))γd + (pb)γp
)1/γp
, (10)
where p denotes the price announced by the pricing policy agent while d and b, respectively,
represent a tenant’s traffic load and requested resources in terms of RBs. All arguments here
refer to the same epoch. The parameters α, γd and γp characterize the individual tenant behavior;
the settings of these parameters determine the sensitivity of the dis-utility function to the current
load or price and can therefore allow modeling different tenant behaviors and reactions to price
changes. These parameters can be modified on-the-fly, allowing the tenants to dynamically change
their shared spectrum allocation policy. Raising the sum in (10) to the power 1/γp expresses
the value of the dis-utility in units of “cost”, bearing the same interpretation for all tenants. This
allows introducing the notion of “total dis-utility” calculated as the sum of dis-utilities over all
tenants. Through (10) and given the price pt and the level of traffic load lti , corresponding to
d(lti ) RBs, the agent of each tenant i requests from the Iris cell agent the number of RBs that
minimizes its dis-utility i.e., arg minb U¯i(b; d(lti ), p).
Based on the above, we created 4 tenant profiles for our evaluations (Table I), using different
parameterizations of (10) to model different tenant behaviors. The choice of parameters for these
profiles was made based on the analysis in the appendix, with the goal of capturing a wide range
of sensible and diverse tenant behaviors that would allow a more accurate and realistic evaluation
of our mechanism. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, tenants were assigned these profiles in
a cyclic manner, i.e., tenant 1 to profile 1, tenant 2 to profile 2, tenant 5 to profile 1 etc.
B. Deep Learning Benefits, Feasibility and Scalability
We begin by examining the choice of employing deep reinforcement learning against simpler
reinforcement learning algorithms for solving the problem formulated in §IV-B. We compare the
performance of Iris when using DDPG against the stochastic policy gradient algorithm of [82],
which employs linear function approximators for the actor and the critic (Lin-PG). As illustrated
in Fig. 4a, DDPG converges faster than Lin-PG and attains a much higher overall reward, both of
which are critical characteristics for the success of the proposed mechanism in a real deployment.
Another very important aspect in terms of the mechanism’s practicality is that the benefits
of deep reinforcement learning and the requirement for the real-time communication of tenants
with the neutral-host should not come at the expense of the system’s feasibility and scalability.
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TABLE I: Tenant profiles with different parameterizations of the generic disutility function and
the resulting behaviors.
Profile Type α γp γd Effect
1. “Best effort” 3.5 × 108 2 1
The main focus of the tenant is to maintain a network presence, providing best effort services
with a small amount of radio resources regardless of the price. The tenant is only willing to
cover its load for low prices.
2. Price-driven 2 × 109 2 1 The tenant fully covers its load when the cost is low (e.g. off peak hours with no congestion).
For high prices, it only covers part of its load.
3. Demand-driven 0.203 1 2
The tenant focuses on providing data-demanding services to its users (e.g. video streaming,
IPTV). In times of high load the tenant is willing to buy a large amount of resources,
regardless of the price. In other times, the tenant will queue its traffic until the load increases
enough to buy in bulk.
4. “Medium” QoS
level
1.1 × 105 2 2 Tenant tries to provide a medium level of service, asking a price-dependent fraction
of its load.
(a) Comparison of DDPG and policy gradient algo-
rithm using linear function approximators.
(b) Iris single training step time and bandwidth
requirements for Iris agents message exchanges
Fig. 4: Benefits/feasibility of deep reinforcement learning.
For this reason, we use our prototype implementation to evaluate the performance of Iris for
deployments supporting up to 8 tenants, in order to capture the effects of the scale that we
envision for most practical deployments of the system. Our results are in accordance with the
analysis of the computational complexity and communication overhead presented earlier in
Section IV-C. As illustrated in Fig. 4b, the time required to calculate the new parameters of
the actor and the critic functions by DDPG in a single training step increases linearly with the
number of tenants, but remains below 22ms even for 8 tenants. This linear effect correlates with
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the computational complexity introduced by the linear increase in the number of input layer
units in the neural networks of the actor and critic as the number of tenants grow and is in line
with the complexity discussion in Section IV-C. When setting the epoch duration, the additional
overhead introduced by the message exchanges between the various Iris agents should also be
taken into account. Therefore, setting the epoch duration to 30ms is a reasonable choice (also
used in all our consecutive experiments), that provides a very fine granularity in terms of the
neutral-host agent’s training speed. Offloading the training computations to GPUs (rather than
using the CPU as in our current implementation) can potentially lead to significant reductions in
the execution time, which in turn allows a lower epoch duration and enables Iris to learn even
faster. The bandwidth requirements of Iris for the message exchanges between pricing policy
and cell agents as well as between cell and tenant agents are also illustrated in Fig. 4b. These
requirements are minimal (less than 0.4Mbps) for all practical deployment scenarios of up to 8
tenants and posing a negligible overhead to the edge cloud deployment.
It should be noted that, as discussed in Section IV-C, the results illustrated in Fig. 4b only
depend on the number of tenants sharing the infrastructure and are independent of the amount of
traffic and the way it was generated (simulated or real traffic) or of the actual number of UEs
associated with the tenants of the system. Therefore, our prototype implementation provides us
with a very accurate depiction of Iris’s overhead, demonstrating the feasibility of the system’s
deployment.
C. Characterizing Iris Spectrum Management
Next, we characterize the behavior of the proposed allocation mechanism, considering various
aspects of the dynamic pricing model and their effects to reinforcement learning in terms of
efficiency and time convergence.
Learning behavior for various traffic loads. We evaluate the learning behavior of the pricing
policy agent for four tenants under three different scenarios, each considering a cell with a
different aggregate traffic load: (i) a congested cell (Cell 1), corresponding to the conditions at
3pm from the daily traffic and spectrum availability profiles of Fig. 3; (ii) an uncongested cell
(Cell 2) with low traffic load, corresponding to 8am; and (iii) a cell with high traffic loads (Cell
3) but not in congested state, corresponding to 11am.
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(a) Reward received by neutral-host per pricing
epoch.
(b) RB mismatch and achieved revenue vs target
revenue (dashed line).
Fig. 5: Learning behavior of pricing policy agent for cells with different levels of congestion/loads.
Fig. 5 shows the results for the reward obtained by the pricing policy agent for each of the
three scenarios considered. It also shows the average mismatch between the amount nt of RBs
available during an epoch and the amount
∑
i∈I νti collectively requested by all tenants, as well
as the actual (target) revenue received (set) by the neutral-host, normalized by the maximum
possible revenue for an epoch (equal to pmaxnt). In view of this normalization, the value of the
target revenue T (dashed line) maintains the same value (equal to pc/pmax) for all three scenarios.
In the congested (cell 1) case, the agent begins with a very high RB mismatch, which gets close
to 0 after the first 20000 epochs, indicating that the pricing policy agent is effectively and quickly
learning how to control the requests of the tenants. The neutral-host achieves this by increasing the
price of the RBs as evident from its revenue increase. It should also be noted that the big difference
between achieved and target revenue levels has an effect to the overall reward of the neutral-host
(through function g), which converges to a value that is less than half of the max reward 1.
For cell 2, the mismatch is always positive (underutilization) and close to 500, since the load of
the tenants is very low and the demand can never match the supply. Due to the very low load, it is
infeasible for the neutral-host to fully recover its costs for acquiring the shared spectrum, regardless
of the pricing policy it follows, something reflected in its reward that is scaled down by (5).
Finally, in the case of cell 3 the agent presents a stable behavior, with its RB mismatch and
revenue remaining relatively static throughout the experiment. The aggregate traffic of the tenants
requires an amount of RBs that is roughly equal to the RBs that are available in the system,
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(a) RB mismatch. (b) Neutral-host revenue.
Fig. 6: Effect of reward function parameters on pricing behavior.
while the revenue that is achieved by the neutral-host is very close to the target revenue, leading
to an overall reward for the neutral-host agent that is much closer to the max compared to the
other two cases.
Effect of reward function. We explore how the configuration of the reward function affects the
neutral-host’s learning process, considering four variants of the reward function with different
combinations for the parameters σ and δ, as shown in Fig. 6. In accordance with the discussion in
§IV-B, we can observe that as the value of σ increases, the RB mismatch becomes more unstable
and/or higher from one round to the next (Fig. 6a), but at the same time the achieved revenue gets
closer to the target revenue T (dashed line in Fig. 6b). The reason for this behavior is that higher
values of σ can tolerate higher RB mismatches (since the bell curve of (4) widens). Therefore,
even high mismatches yield relatively significant reward contributions from (4), something that
simplifies the pricing decision, by making the pricing policy to be mainly driven by the other
factor (5) of the reward function. The results in Fig. 6 also indicate (as per discussion in §IV-B)
that increasing the value of δ also promotes a closer match between actual and target revenue
levels (driven by a more significant effect of (5)). Naturally, this has also an effect in the achieved
RB mismatch, which increases. This is because the effort to match actual and target revenue
levels triggers a lower price per RB, subsequently leading to an increased demand by the tenants.
Different number of tenants. We evaluate the learning behavior of the dynamic pricing mech-
anism as the number and behavior of active tenants vary (recall that the behavior of each tenant
depends on its index, as explained in §VI-A). We consider three cases with two, four and six tenants
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(a) Effect of number of tenants in learning. (b) Prior training effect to pricing mechanism.
(c) Adaptation to dynamic policy changes. (d) Impact of target revenue.
Fig. 7: Behavior of Iris pricing mechanism under different conditions: varying number of tenants;
prior training; dynamic tenant policy changes; and different costs for acquiring shared spectrum.
and a congested cell with the aggregate traffic of 16Mbps across all tenants with equal levels of
traffic. Fig. 7a shows the average RB mismatch and the pricing choices of the neutral-host. For four
and six tenants the system begins with a negative mismatch, while for two tenants with a positive
mismatch. This is related to the effect of neutral-host’s pricing choices to the tenants, given their
loads and shared spectrum allocation profiles. For two tenants, the initial prices are considered high,
leading to the underutilization of the resources, despite the cell congestion. On the other hand, for
four and six tenants and given the increased competition, the price is low, leading to excess demand.
In all cases, the agent adapts and discovers an appropriate pricing policy to minimize the mismatch.
Effect of prior training. We evaluate the effect of prior training to the results achieved by the
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neutral-host. We perform an experiment for two consecutive days, starting from a state of no
training and focus on the results obtained during the same hour of the day (3pm from the daily
profile). As it can be seen in Fig. 7b, the second day yields improved results compared to the
first day (zero training), which is evident both from the better mean reward (the brief drops of
the instantaneous reward, lasting for less than a minute each, are inconsequential), as well as
from the reduced average RB mismatch during the second day. However, the differences between
the two days are small, demonstrating the effectiveness of the mechanism even without any
substantial prior training.
Effect of dynamic policy changes. This experiment demonstrates the adaptiveness of the
dynamic pricing mechanism when tenants make policy changes dynamically. In this scenario, the
experiment runs for 120000 epochs using the default tenant profiles. When this period elapses,
and once the agent has identified an appropriate pricing policy for the given load, the first
tenant’s policy changes to profile #2 (Table I). This leads to a temporary failure of the agent to
appropriately price the available radio resources, which is translated into a major RB mismatch
(Fig. 7c). However, after about 30000 epochs (150000 epochs in the experiment), the neutral-host
agent manages to re-adapt to the new behavior of tenant 1.
Effect of target revenue level/shared spectrum acquisition cost. We evaluate the effect of the
target revenue level to the pricing decisions. Since we employ target revenue levels of the form
T(n) = pcnt , changes to the target revenue level correspond to changes in the shared spectrum
acquisition price pc. We proceed by applying different values of pc and comparing the actual
(target) revenues received (set) by the neutral-host, again both normalized by the maximum possible
revenue for an epoch. As it can be seen in Fig. 7d, both revenue levels increase along with pc. For
the lower acquisition prices, and due to the high load (traffic at 3pm) and the network congestion,
tenants are willing to buy the RBs in prices much higher than pc. Therefore, the neutral-host finds a
balance on the goals of (3) by announcing lower prices (creating excess demand) in order to bring
the actual and target revenue levels as close as possible (avoiding the overcharging of tenants for
the resources). On the other hand, as the acquisition price increases, the gap between the target and
actual revenue levels decreases, with the target surpassing the actual revenue for pc = 2000. At the
same time, the RB mismatch becomes smaller and turns from excess demand to excess supply (pos-
itive mismatch) for pc = 1500 and pc = 2000. This is because the neutral-host, driven by its reward
function, learns pricing policies that make the tenants buy less RBs on average, but at higher prices.
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D. Comparison with Alternative Approaches
We compare the performance of the Iris dynamic pricing mechanism with alternative approaches
in terms of the benefits provided to tenants. We consider the traffic generated for a whole day (full
profile presented in Fig. 3) for four tenants with their behaviors defined in Table I. The agent is
evaluated against other schemes without any prior training. This worst-case scenario is important
to benchmark the effectiveness of the neutral-host agent’s operation in volatile environments.
We compare the dynamic pricing mechanism of Iris against the distributed optimization algorithm
proposed in [42]. Based on that, the neutral-host iteratively adjusts the price of the available RBs in
order to control the behavior of tenants that are driven by the goal of minimizing their dis-utilities.
Assuming a static environment, the algorithm in [42] has been shown to converge to an optimal
solution in terms of the utilization of the available resources, but does not inherently capture
the requirement of Iris regarding the revenue target of the neutral-host. For this, we consider
two variants of [42]: (i) the vanilla version in which the neutral-host does not set a reserve price
for the resources it distributes to the tenants (Distributed No Reserve Price—DNRP) and; (ii) a
modified version, in which the neutral-host sets a reserve price equal to the cost of a resource
block (pc = 850), in an attempt to avoid experiencing losses (Distributed Reserve Price—DRP).
Another alternative we compare against and which could be viewed as a variant of the optimal
solution is an unrealistic myopic pricing scheme in which the neutral-host knows the dis-utility
functions of the tenants. Using this knowledge, it determines at each epoch, the price to charge the
tenants by minimizing the sum of tenant dis-utilities, subject to the resource availability constraint
and the requirement that the neutral-host matching or exceeding the target revenue level, i.e.,
min
p,®ν
∑
i∈I
U¯i(νi; d, p)
s.t. p
∑
νi ≥ T(n),
∑
νi ≤ n, νi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I
The neutral-host allocates the resources myopically during each epoch (in the sense that it views
each epoch in isolation) so that it does not incur losses even in the short-term. A side-effect of this
is that under very low traffic load, the neutral-host forces the tenants to buy more resources than
they actually need, to recover the acquisition cost for the spectrum. It is noted that the comparative
evaluation does not consider as a baseline the unrealistic but “optimal” solution which optimizes the
allocation of resources considering the network dynamics (traffic, spectrum cost, tenant behaviors)
throughout the whole day. The complex modeling requirements accounting for the dependency
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Fig. 8: Comparison of Iris with alternative approaches in terms of total dis-utility of tenants and
profit of neutral-host.
across epochs, the high computational complexity of obtaining the optimal solution and the fact
that this needs to be performed over and over again in time makes it impractical even as a baseline.
In addition to the myopic scheme outlined above, we also consider four static pricing schemes,
where the price announced by the agent during each epoch t is fixed to pmax/8 ≈ 312 (Static
Low), 3pmax/8 ≈ 937 (Static Med-L), 5pmax/8 ≈ 1562 (Static Med-H) and 7pmax/8 ≈ 2187
(Static High) correspondingly, to capture the whole range of possible prices.
We begin by looking at the average dis-utility of the tenants for each pricing scheme and the total
normalized revenue above the target level made by the neutral-host (Fig. 8). The revenue is normal-
ized by the maximum possible revenue of the neutral-host, i.e., selling all the available resources
at the max price of pmax . In terms of the dis-utility, we can observe that Iris performs worse than
DNRP and DRP as well as two of the lowest static pricing schemes (Static Low and Static Med-L).
However, through the revenue results, we observe that for those four schemes the neutral-host
experiences losses (negative profit), disincentivizing the neutral-host to provide its service in the
first place. This could have been avoided if the pricing policy dynamically adapted not only based
on the utilization of the resources, but also based on the revenue target set by the neutral-host.
The results are opposite for the myopic and the higher static pricing schemes (Med-H and High)
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Fig. 9: Hourly breakdown of tenants’ total dis-utility and average price selected by neutral-host
in Iris against alternative approaches.
in that with these schemes the neutral-host obtains a revenue that is higher than the set target
at the expense of a higher tenant dis-utility compared to Iris. For the static pricing schemes, this
is due to the inability of the pricing mechanism to adapt to the traffic loads, charging high prices
even at times of no congestion (e.g., 1am-10am when the traffic load is low or 6pm-9pm when
there is abundance of spectrum). For the myopic scheme, however, this is due to the neutral-host
agent forcing tenants to buy resources not needed to myopically recover its spectrum acquisition
cost within each epoch. These behaviors are better seen in the hourly breakdown of the tenants’
dis-utilities and corresponding prices decided by the neutral-host as shown in Fig. 9. The Iris
dynamic pricing mechanism manages to draw a balance between the needs of the tenants and the
neutral-host more effectively, learning the right pricing policy that keeps the tenants as satisfied
as possible, but without incurring a low revenue that would disincentivize the neutral-host.
In terms of the offered service, we measure the total traffic served by a cell throughout the day
and calculate the average bits per price unit that the tenants bought for each pricing scheme. The
results are in Fig. 10a. We omit DNRP, DRP and the static Low and Med-L schemes, given the
losses they incur to the neutral-host. As we can observe, Iris offers the cheapest service, benefiting
from the adaptiveness of its pricing scheme. Note that, although the same adaptiveness is also
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(a) Total traffic served and bits per price unit. (b) Iris and myopic scheme service differentiation.
Fig. 10: Comparison of Iris with alternative approaches.
offered by the myopic scheme, the fact that tenants might be forced to buy unwanted resources
raises the overall service cost. Another interesting observation is that, the total traffic served in
the High static pricing scheme is significantly lower than that of Iris. This is because, due to the
high prices, the tenants avoid buying radio resources despite the availability (evident from the fact
that the other pricing schemes served more traffic with the same overall amount of resources).
Finally, we compare the service differentiation offered by Iris against the myopic scheme and the
spectrum allocation policy proposed in [38]. The latter allocates RBs to the tenants proportionally
to their load, so it can be viewed as a purely load dependent but pricing agnostic scheme. For this
result, the myopic scheme can act as a baseline, since the neutral-host is aware of the dis-utility
functions of the tenants and thus optimally distributes the resources among them. The results
appear in Fig. 10b. As we can observe, Iris provides service differentiation among tenants, with
results that are close to that of the myopic scheme. For the proportional scheme, no differentiation
can be achieved (since every tenant generates the same traffic load). This can have a negative
impact to the tenants’ satisfaction, since the tenants that value the available spectrum the most
end up getting less resources than they would like during hours of congestion (e.g., 12-6pm).
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We believe that our work opens up a number of interesting research opportunities, which we
discuss here.
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Strategic tenants. In the current work it is assumed that tenants present a behavior that is
invariant to the choices of other tenants and to their capability of affecting the price announced
by the neutral-host through their actions. However, it is natural to expect that in many cases
tenants could also develop strategic behavior, e.g. use their own learning agents, making resource
requests that optimize their long-term benefits given the prices announced by the neutral-host.
In such scenarios, we no longer have time-invariant transition rates from the point of view of
any one agent (neutral-host or tenant), which can make the problem of solving the model much
harder. One way to overcome this challenge could be to consider the problem in the context of a
multi-agent reinforcement learning framework like [83]. Another approach could be to restrict
the way that tenants behave and request resources, by enforcing the use of a mechanism that
prohibits strategic behavior. Such a mechanism could for example restrict the frequency with
which tenants can change their policy or to employ a domain specific language through which
the Iris tenant agents could express their business models and demands in a constrained way.
Tenant tradeoffs driving the use of the neutral-host deployment. The focus of this work has
been on the neutral-host side and on how to identify a radio resource pricing policy that can
allow the neutral-host to match the available radio resource supply with the tenant demand while
reaching a certain revenue target. As already mentioned, our work makes no assumptions about
how the tenant spectrum acquisition behavior should be modelled, as long as the interactions of
tenants with the neutral-host adhere to the dynamic pricing mechanism presented in Section III.
Regardless of the method used to model the tenant behavior (e.g. utility function or something
else), a very important factor that most probably should be taken into account is the revenue that
the tenant is expected to make by distributing the obtained resources to its associated UEs and
how this relates to the tenant’s OpEx. Since different tenants can have different business models,
developing a variety of Iris tenant agent implementations that can capture the demands of those
business models is a very interesting and important problem for future research.
Another important factor that can drive the tenant behavior is that, as already mentioned at
the outset, traditional operators have the option to serve users in indoor spaces either by using
their own outdoor RAN infrastructure or by using the indoor neutral-host deployment after
paying some fee. Due to these options that operators have, a complementary problem to the one
considered here is how operators should decide whether it is preferable to use the neutral-host’s
infrastructure or to rely on their own. This decision could involve aspects like the level of the
fee charged by the neutral-host, the number of users that would benefit from the presence of
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the operator in the indoor space, as well as the performance improvement that the users would
experience through that.
Co-existence of multiple neutral-hosts in other settings. As already explained, in the setting
of this work only a single neutral-host is expected to exist (e.g. due to indoor space constraints
and regulations), with its main incentive for providing its service being the improvement of the
quality of experience of residents and visitors. However, when considering settings where multiple
neutral-hosts could be co-located (e.g. outdoor settings) the goals of the system could change. In
such settings, attracting more users and maximizing profit would also be equally significant for
the neutral-host in addition to the ones like the regulation of spectrum among tenants considered
in this paper. In such scenarios an alternative framework would be required (e.g. a game-theoretic
framework) to drive the behavior of each individual neutral-host, considering the actions of the
other neutral-hosts.
Spectrum management related issues. One obvious extension of Iris is to expand its scope to
also support pooled licensed as well as unlicensed spectrum. While our system design and dynamic
pricing mechanism would still form the core solution in both of these cases, modifications would
also be required due to the idiosyncrasies that these scenarios present. For pooled licensed spectrum,
pricing needs to additionally account for revenue sharing with MNOs contributing licensed
spectrum to the pool. On the other hand, in the case of unlicensed spectrum, coexistence issues with
other technologies like Wi-Fi need to be addressed (e.g. using a technology like MulteFire [62]).
The dynamics of the interaction between the spectrum manager of Iris and the external
repositories for shared spectrum acquisition is another relevant topic. Deciding on the amount of
spectrum to request from an external repository can be a challenging problem for the neutral-
host, due to the different loads and demands presented by different small-cells, which create a
requirement to draw a balance between the spectrum acquisition cost and the satisfaction of the
tenants’ demands.
Multi-RAT support. Another interesting research topic is providing support for Iris in multi-RAT
settings. Accommodating multiple disparate radio access technologies (e.g., 5G New Radio, LTE
and Wi-Fi) as part of the same neutral-host system architecture is an approach in line with the 5G
vision of native multi-access with an access agnostic core network architecture. However multi-
RAT support presents its own set of challenges, with the main problem being on how tenants should
decide which of the available technologies to use to accommodate the needs of their users, consider-
ing that each technology presents its own pros and cons in terms of performance, cost, capacity etc.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented Iris, a system architecture for neutral-host indoor small-cells based on shared
spectrum. The design of Iris follows a C-RAN approach that allows scalable and efficient use of
resources in the edge cloud while enable denser and cheaper small-cell radio infrastructure indoors.
At the core of Iris lies a novel dynamic pricing radio resource allocation mechanism for shared
spectrum. This mechanism employs deep reinforcement learning to discover pricing policies that
allow tenants to request shared spectrum resources on demand, ensuring the differentiation of
their services based on their valuation of the spectrum, while meeting the revenue target of the
neutral-host that includes recouping the costs for shared spectrum acquistion. Using our prototype
implementation of Iris developed for LTE, we have conducted extensive experimental evaluations
to characterize the dynamic pricing mechanism of Iris under different conditions, show the benefits
of the Iris approach compared to alternative approaches and examine its deployment feasibility.
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APPENDIX
MODELLING THE EFFECT OF TRAFFIC LOAD AND UNIT PRICE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
NEUTRAL-HOST TENANTS
A. Preliminaries
Let d ≥ 0 be the traffic load of the tenant and let p ≥ 0 be the price charged by the neutral-host
per resource block. Suppose that the tenant requests b ≥ 0 resource blocks from the neutral-host.
This decision has a cost equal to pb and creates a backlog of traffic equal to [d − b]+ (using the
standard notation [x]+ , max {x, 0}). Obviously, higher values of b reduce (or eliminate) the
backlog, but also increase the cost.
To express this trade-off, we consider dis-utility functions U¯ : R+0 → R+0 of the form
U¯(b; d, p) =
(
a
([d − b]+)γd + (pb)γp )1/γp, a > 0, γd, γp ≥ 1. (11)
The exponents γd and γp in (11) tune the sharpness of the dissatisfaction associated with the
backlog of traffic and with the cost of the resources respectively, while the factor a expresses
the relative importance of these two sources of dissatisfaction in the overall dis-utility. In the
following, we will investigate the use of the dis-utility function for determining the optimal
resource allocation request b∗(d, p) , arg minb≥0 U¯(b; d, p), under a given price and traffic load.
With respect to the units of the various quantities involved, and apart from the two exponents γd
and γp, which are dimensionless, d and b are expressed in units of [resource block]. The price p
is in units of [cost]/[resource block], while the factor a is in units of [cost]γp/[resource block]γd .
Finally, since the parenthesized sum in (11) is raised to the power of 1/γp, the values of the
dis-utility function U¯ are expressed in units of [cost].
This last feature is worthwhile because, apart from the use of the dis-utility function for
determining b∗, the function is useful also for quantifying the dis-utility experienced by multiple
tenants, whose dis-utility functions may employ different values for the parameters γd , γp and a.
Regardless of such differences, all dis-utilities will be expressible in the same unit of [cost], bearing
the same interpretation for all tenants and being directly comparable. Additionally, it is possible
to introduce a notion of ‘overall dis-utility’, calculated as the sum of dis-utilities over all tenants.
B. Structural properties
Since (·)γp is strictly increasing, the minima of U¯(· ; d, p) and of U(· ; d, p) , U¯(·; d, p)γp ,
coincide. Thus, we may work with the simpler function U, equal to the parenthesized sum
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in (11).
By construction, U is continuous and convex (because γd, γp ≥ 1) throughout its domain. In
fact, U is strictly convex (and its derivative strictly increasing), except when γd = γp = 1, in
which case it is piecewise linear.
In view of (11), U is continuously differentiable in [0, d) ∪ (d,+∞), with
U′(b; d, p) =

−aγd(d − b)γd−1 + γppγpbγp−1, 0 ≤ b < d,
γppγpbγp−1, b > d.
(12)
The derivative in (12) is continuous also at b = d and U′(d) exists unless γd = 1, in which case
U′(d−) < U′(d+).
By the second branch in (12), U is increasing for b > d, so the infimum of the function
occurs within the closed and bounded interval [0, d] and, by continuity, there exists a minimal
point b∗ ∈ [0, d]. Furthermore, by convexity, this minimal point is unique (except perhaps for the
non-strictly convex case γd = γp = 1 when the minimum may be attained for all points of an
interval within [0, d]).
C. The optimal resource allocation request b∗(d, p)
We now express b∗ as a function of the given traffic load and price. As we will see, the shape
of this function depends on the values of the exponents γd and γp.
1) The case γd = γp = 1 – extreme behavior: By (12), U is decreasing throughout [0, d]
when p < a, increasing when p > a, and constant when p = a. Thus,
b∗(d, p) =

d, p < a,
any b ∈ [0, d], p = a,
0, p > a.
(13)
The form (13) signifies “extreme” behavior. The factor a fixes a price threshold and the tenant
either makes a resource request equal to the traffic load when the price is below the threshold,
or backlogs all its traffic when the price exceeds the threshold.
2) The case γd = 1, γp > 1 – cost saving tendency; limiting allocations below a price-dependent
threshold: By (12), if U′(d−) ≤ 0, i.e., if a ≥ γppγpdγp−1 then U is decreasing throughout [0, d]
and b∗ = d. Otherwise, the minimization occurs at the unique solution of U′(b) = 0. Putting
these facts together,
b∗(d, p) = min
{( a
γppγp
) 1
γp−1
, d
}
. (14)
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This result may be interpreted as follows: Fixing a price determines a traffic load threshold d0,
equal to the first argument of the min-operator within (14). For traffic loads lower than this
threshold the tenant requests resource blocks equal to the load; for higher ones, resource blocks
for a load of d0 are requested and the remaining part of the traffic is backlogged.
An alternative interpretation may also be given, by first fixing the traffic load d and then
varying p. Along this interpretation, as prices increase, starting from an initially low level close
to 0, the traffic is fully covered. This occurs up to a load-dependent price threshold (obtained by
equating the two arguments of the min-operator in (14) and then solving for p), while higher prices
introduce backlog. In this regime, the processed part of the traffic gradually diminishes as p→∞.
It may be seen that as γp ↓ 1, the case considered in this section tends to the extreme case in
Section C1 and (14) collapses to (13).
3) The case γd > 1, γp = 1 – limiting backlogs below a price-dependent threshold: In view
of (12), when U′(0) ≥ 0, i.e., when p ≥ aγddγd−1, the function U is increasing throughout [0, d]
and b∗ = 0. Otherwise, the minimization occurs at the unique solution of U′(b) = 0. Overall,
b∗(d, p) =
[
d −
( p
aγd
) 1
γd−1
]+
. (15)
According to this result, fixing a price again determines a traffic load threshold d0, now equal to
the term subtracted from d in (15). For traffic loads higher than the threshold the tenant requests
resource blocks that will only partially cover its load, creating a backlog of remaining traffic
equal to d0. Loads lower than the threshold are entirely backlogged. This behavior tends to favor
higher traffic loads over lower ones.
For the alternative interpretation related to fixed traffic loads and varying prices, it may be
seen that as prices increase, again starting from an initially low level close to 0, the unprocessed
part of the traffic gradually increases. Past a load-dependent price (obtained by equating the two
terms subtracted in (15) and solving for p), the entire traffic load is backlogged.
Again, it may be seen that as γd ↓ 1, the case considered here tends to the extreme case in
Section C1 and (15) collapses to (13).
4) The case γd > 1, γp > 1 and the balanced sub-case γd = γp = γ > 1: Now, U′(0) < 0,
and U′(d) > 0, so b∗ lies in the interior of [0, d] and is determined as the unique solution of
U′(b) = 0, equivalently the unique solution of the non-linear equation (in b)(γppγp
γda
) 1
γd−1 b
γp−1
γd−1 + b = d. (16)
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Generally, this equation must be solved numerically, but for γd − 1 = 2(γp − 1) (closer in spirit
to the case of Section C3) and for γd − 1 = (γp − 1)/2 (closer in spirit to the case of Section C2)
the equation reduces to a quadratic leading to a closed form solution.
Again, it may be seen that by keeping γp fixed and letting γd ↓ 1 the case in this section tends
to the case in Section C2. Similarly, by keeping γd fixed and letting γp ↓ 1, this case reduces to the
case of Section C3. Finally, letting both exponents tend to unity leads to the case in Section C1.
When the exponents are equal and greater than unity, (16) collapses to a first order linear
equation with solution
b∗(d, p) = d
1 + (pγ/a) 1γ−1
. (17)
It is seen that all levels of traffic loads are treated uniformly, with the tenant requesting resource
blocks that will neither fully cover nor entirely backlog the existing traffic load. Instead, the
price determines the fraction of the traffic to be processed. As γ ↓ 1 this solution adopts the
sharp characteristics of the case in Section C1.
D. Parametrizing the dis-utility function
Here we consider values for the parameters of the dis-utility function U¯, to tailor the function
to a particular tenant’s behavior and create the tenant profiles presented in Table I of Section VI-A.
We address the cases in Sections C2, C3 and C4. In each of these, one needs to determine values
for an exponent and for the factor a. The value of the exponent is chosen first, to determine the
“sharpness” of the function’s response. Then, to determine the factor a one proceeds as follows:
• For the “cost saving” case in Section C2, one specifies a traffic load threshold d0 and a price
threshold p0. These determine the value of a, so that for prices and loads not greater than
the thresholds the traffic load of a tenant is fully processed. By equating the two arguments
of the min-operator in (14), with the price and load therein set equal to the thresholds, the
appropriate value of the factor is seen to be
a = γpp
γp
0 d
γp−1
0 . (18)
Profiles 1 and 2 of Table I were based on this “cost saving” case, with γp = 2 (and γd = 1).
For the first profile, a traffic load threshold d0 = 1750 and a price threshold p0 = 100 were
used, leading to a value of a = 3.5 × 108 and a “best effort” profile type, in which the tenant
is willing to fully cover its load for very low prices (recall that pmax = 2500  p0) and only a
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small part of the load otherwise (just to maintain network presence). For the second profile,
a traffic load threshold d0 = 1000 and a price threshold p0 = 1000 were used (a = 2 × 109).
This leads to a “price-driven” profile that is similar to the first one, with the difference that the
tenant is willing to buy more resources for low to medium prices compared to the best-effort
case (not just focusing on maintaining network presence).
• For the “bounded backlog” case in Section C3, one again specifies a traffic load threshold d0
and a price threshold p0. These determine the value of a, so that for prices greater than p0 and
loads lower than d0 the traffic is backlogged entirely. By equating the two terms subtracted
in (15), with the price and load therein set equal to the thresholds, the appropriate value of the
factor is seen to be
a =
p0
γdd
γd−1
0
. (19)
The third profile of Table I was based on this analysis, with γd = 2 (and γp = 1). The traffic
load threshold was set to d0 = 6000 and the price threshold to p0 = 2436 (i.e., close to pmax),
leading to a value of a = 0.203. This profile corresponds to a “demand-driven” tenant, who is
willing to buy large amounts of resources regardless of the price when the traffic load is high
and to queue its traffic until the load increases enough to buy in bulk in other times.
• Finally, for the balanced sub-case in Section C4, one must specify a price threshold p0 and
the corresponding fraction ω0 ∈ (0, 1) of the traffic load that will be processed. Then, in view
of (17), the appropriate value of the factor is seen to be
a = pγ0
( ω0
1 − ω0
)γ−1
. (20)
Correspondingly, the last profile of Table I was set to represent a “medium” QoS level type of
tenant with γ = 2, p0 = 600 and ω0 ≈ 0.25, yielding a = 1.1 × 105.
